PRODUCTS LIABILITY-NEW
SONABLY

DANGEROUS"

JERSEY COURT ELIMINATES "UNREA-

REQUIREMENT IN STRICT TORT LIABILITY

ACTION-Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d
562 (L. Div. 1973).
Lois Glass was seriously injured when the automobile in which she
and her son were riding left the road and collided with a telephone
pole.' To recover for severe lacerations of the face, Glass instituted an
action grounded in warranty against the automobile dealer, Westfield
Motor Sales, and the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that a metallurgical defect in the strut of the
2
right front wheel caused her to lose control of the car.
Although the plaintiff proceeded initially on a warranty theory,
the cause was ultimately submitted to the jury on the theory of strict
liability in tort." Defendant Ford Motor Company submitted a request
to charge which stated in part that the product must be unreasonably
dangerous in order to establish liability of the manufacturer apart from
negligence. 4 The terminology was apparently drawn verbatim from sec1 Letter from Richard J. Badolato, attorney for defendant Ford Motor Co., to author,
Sept. 10, 1973, on file in the Seton Hall Law Review.
2 Id.
3 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose under the Uniform Commercial Code.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-314 (1962) provides in part:
(I) Unless excluded or modified (12A:2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-315 (1962) provides in part:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment . . . there is unless excluded or modified . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Despite the pleadings, the court decided that the theory of strict liability in tort was
equally applicable. The court urged that
"[pjractical administration suggests that the principle of liability be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort thus enabling it to be applied in practice
unconfined by the narrow conceptualism associated with the technical niceties
of sales and implied warranties."
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601, 304 A.2d 562, 563 (L. Div. 1973)
(quoting from Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969)).
4 The requested charge read in its entirety as follows:
The standard of safety with respect to the liability of the manufacturer of
a product apart from negligence is similar to that described as the implied
warranty of merchantability, and with respect to the allegation of liability
against the defendant apart from negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing, along with causation, that the product was unreasonably dangerous
and not reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which such articles are sold
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tion 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which suggests criteria
for determining a seller's liability for injuries caused by a defective
5
product.
Nevertheless, in Glass v. Ford Motor Co.,6 the court held that
the additional element of "unreasonable danger" is not a valid
part of the concept of strict liability in tort in the State of New
Jersey.7
The court expressly adopted as law section 402 A without the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous," rendering unnecessary a finding that the
product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."8 The
court further held that if in a products liability action a jury finds
that the product was defective while in the hands of the defendant,
the defect proximately caused the harm, and the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable user or consumer of the product, a verdict may be rendered for the plaintiff.9 Thus, the effect of Glass, if viewed as persuasive
by other courts, will be to substantially ease the plaintiff's burden of
proof in an action based on strict liability in tort.
Prior to the emergence of the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
an injured plaintiff's recovery in a products liability action was predicated on either a negligence' ° or warranty" theory. While both theories
and used because of a defect therein which arose out of the design, preparation
or manufacture of the article while it was in the control of the manufacturer.
123 N.J. Super. at 601, 304 A.2d at 563-64 (emphasis added by the court).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402 A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
6 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973).
7 Id. at 601, 304 A.2d at 564.
8 Id. at 601-02, 304 A.2d at 564 (emphasis by the court).
9 Id. at 602, 304 A.2d at 564.
10 The liability of a manufacturer or other supplier for damage caused by his
product is based on the supplier's failure to exercise reasonable care. See, e.g., Nelson v.
Freuhauf Trailer Co., 11 N.J. 413, 417, 94 A.2d 655, 656 (1953).
11 Liability in warranty arises where damage is caused by the failure of a product
to measure up to express or implied representations on the part of the manufacturer or
other supplier. Accordingly, an injured plaintiff is not required to prove negligence
when proceeding in warranty. Because breach of warranty liability is a form of absolute
liability, it is the preferred approach for establishing liability for product-caused injury.
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posed substantial obstacles to recovery,' 2 the most onerous was the defense of privity of contract. 13 Judge Cardozo assaulted the privity requirement in the 1916 landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,14 in which the court held a manufacturer liable for negligence to
a remote user of his product. Judge Cardozo enunciated a principle imposing a duty of reasonable care upon a manufacturer if the nature of
his product is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made. 1 Furthermore, the court held that the
manufacturer's duty extends to all foreseeable users of the product.
However, after MacPherson,a plaintiff was still burdened with the difficulty of establishing the manufacturer's failure to exercise due care.
Gradually, there was a shift away from the negligence theory of
recovery in a products liability action toward strict liability based on
warranty principles. 16 Nevertheless, privity continued to be a major
obstacle barring many injured consumers from recovery. Finally, in
1960, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'7 the New Jersey
supreme court abrogated the requirement of privity in a breach of imSee 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 16.01[1], at 3-4 to 3-7 (1972);
1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3:1 (1961).
12 In a negligence action for damages caused by a defective product, it is often
extremely difficult for the plaintiff to show that a particular defendant was responsible
for the defect, or that there was any specific negligent act or omission which caused the
defect.
In an action for breach of warranty, recovery might be precluded by such defenses as
that the plaintiff was not in "privity" with the defendant, that there had not been
"reliance" on any warranty, that the plaintiff did not comply with certain notice requirements, or that the* defendant had expressly disclaimed liability for such injuries or
damages as those for which the plaintiff was seeking to recover. See R. HURSH, AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 5A:I, at 327-28 (Supp. 1973).
13 The most notable exception to the privity requirement involved defective food
and drink cases. For a history of the food and drink cases, see Prosser, The Assault upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960).
14 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
15 The importance of this principle is that it expanded the situations in which
privity of contract was unnecessary. Prior to MacPherson, privity was not required in
actions for damages caused by imminently dangerous products. However, Judge Cardozo
held that the exception to the requirement of privity was not properly to be limited
to "poisons, explosives, and things of like nature . . . which in their normal operation
are implements of destruction." Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
16 Recognition that a plaintiff should not have to prove negligence or fault on
the part of someone who has distributed a defective or hazardous product in order to
recover for injuries caused by that product prompted the shift away from the negligence
theory and toward strict liability. See Address by L. Frumer, 1966 Annual Seminar of
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, April 15-16, 1966, set forth at length in AN IN DEPTH
STUDY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, at 45.
17 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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plied warranty action.' The policies upon which the Henningsen court
based its imposition of strict liability in warranty 9 soon gave rise to the
recognition of a cause of action based on strict liability in tort.
The first reported decision to apply the doctrine of strict tort liability in a products liability action was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 20 The plaintiff in Greenman was seriously injured when a

piece of wood on which he was working flew out of a defectively designed power tool given to him by his wife. 21 He subsequently brought
an action against the retailer and the manufacturer, alleging breach of
warranty and negligence.
Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that the
'remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon
the intricacies of the law of sales.' "22 To insure that the cost of injuries
would be borne by the party responsible for placing the defective product on the market, rather than by the consumer who is powerless to
protect himself,2 3 the court held:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for de24
fects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
Essential to the plaintiff's recovery, however, was proof that the
18 Henningsen also restricted the manufacturer's ability to disclaim responsibility
for personal injuries caused by defects in his products. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
19 The Henningsen court stated:
"The interest in consumer protection calls for warranties by the maker that do
run with the goods, to reach all who are likely to be hurt by the use of the
unfit commodity for a purpose ordinarily to be expected."
Id. at 379-80, 161 A.2d at 81 (quoting from 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TnE LAW OF
TORTS § 28.16, at 1571-72 (1956), (footnotes omitted by the court). The court also
emphasized that the obligation of the manufacturer should rest upon "'the demands of
social justice.' " 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83 (quoting from Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 635 (1913)).
20 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
21 Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. A potential bar to plaintiff's
recovery in Greenman was not only California's refusal to extend the "warranty" without
privity beyond food cases, but also the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of the
breach as required by the Uniform Sales Act, Law of August 14, 1931, ch. 1070, § 1769,
[1931] Cal. Laws 2249 (repealed 1965). Justice Traynor overcame these obstacles by
saying that this was not really a matter of warranty but of strict liability in tort. 59
Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California,18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 17 (1966).
22 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (quoting from Ketterer v.
Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
23 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
24 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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injury occurred while the plaintiff, unaware of a defect 25 in either design or manufacture, was using the product in the manner for which
it was intended, and that the defect made the product unsafe for its
26
intended use.
The effect of Justice Traynor's approach was to create a new basis
of recovery which imposed strict liability on the manufacturer for personal injuries caused by defective products. The Greenman decision
led the way in affording an injured plaintiff a remedy which disregarded
the convolutions of the warranty approach. 27 By the mid-sixties, the
acceptance of a strict liability theory for suppliers of defective products
had become sufficiently widespread to cause the drafters of the Restatement to include a broad section detailing the liability of sellers of defective goods.

28

See note 71 infra.
59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
27 The distinction between warranty and strict liability in tort principles has often
been ambiguous. The root of the problem is the uncertain nature and character of
warranty, which is a curious hybrid of tort and contract. Although warranty was
originally a tort action, it has become identified in practice with a contract of sale. For
a history of the development of warranty principles, see Prosser, supra note 13, at 1126-34.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment m at 355-56 (1965).
The confusion between warranty and tort principles has been compounded by courts
which have failed to distinguish the two. In 1963, the New York court of appeals
arrived at the conclusion that strict liability was applicable, but it did so by continuing to
speak in warranty language. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), the requirement of privity in an implied warranty of
merchantability action was eliminated. The court stated that
[a] breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer.
12 N.Y.2d at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965). Section 402 A underwent several
changes before reaching its final form. The section was originally limited to sales of
"food for human consumption." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1961). A revision of the section, adopted in 1962, extended strict liability to products
for "intimate bodily use." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
The draft was further amended in 1964 to extend strict liability to "any product."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). See Titus, Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv.
713, 713 (1970).
In Dean Prosser's view, recent decisions expanding the principle of strict liability
in tort to all products necessitated a corresponding extension of the scope of section
402 A. Addressing the American Law Institute, he predicted that the section would be
obsolete soon after publication of the Restatement if the extension were not made.
No one has to be any seer or soothsayer to foresee that this is becoming
the law of the immediate future. There are some sixteen jurisdictions now in
which there are indications that this law of strict liability to the ultimate user
or consumer goes beyond food or products for intimate bodily use. Therefore
25
26
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The Restatement, as well as all other authorities supporting the
doctrine of strict liability, requires that the plaintiff establish the existence of a defect in the product. 29 Generally, two major categories of
defects are recognized: defects occasioned by faulty manufacture and
defects in the design of the product.3 0 According to the Restatement, a
defective condition is one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."81 To be unreasonably
dangerous
[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it becomes apparent that if our Section of the Restatement which we have approved is to be published this summer in Volume 2 of the Restatement, it will
be on the edge of becoming dated before it is published.
41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 350 (1964).

Section 402 A, however, did not meet with unanimous approval following its
promulgation by the American Law Institute. The Defense Research Institute, Inc., for
example, argued that
[sjtrict liability in tort is still a minority position, and the job of The
American Law Institute is to restate what the law is-not what some members
think it should be. Section 402A is an attack upon established legal fundamentals which, if successful, will not only carry the day for the social planners but
will also strike a heavy blow to the free enterprise system.
Dalrymple, Brief opposing Strict Liability In Tort, in PRODUCTS LsABILrr 2:60, 2:85 (S.
Schreiber & P. Rheingold ed. 1967).
Section 402 A was also criticized in Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law
Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343, 359 (1965), where the author
characterized the section as being "hasty and ill-advised." Dean Prosser, however, came
to the defense of section 402 A in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
29 Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability
in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1966); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACuSE L.
REv. 559 (1969); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. R.v. 363 (1965).
30 A manufacturing defect exists when a product is in a condition other than that
intended by the manufacturer. It is usually caused by a miscarriage of the manufacturing
process or by incorporation of defective materials within the product.
A design defect exists when the product is manufactured as intended but the article,
as designed and marketed, is unreasonably dangerous. Whether an unreasonable danger
is created by a product's design is determined by general negligence principles, which
involve "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens,
against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm." 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 28.4, at 1542 (1956). See Kessler, Products Liability,
76 YALE L.J. 887, 900 (1967); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1962); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-17 (1965); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 297 (1966).
81 REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment g at 351 (1965).
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it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
82
its characteristics.

The Restatement definition emphasizes the unexpected dangers of the
product. 88 Clearly, harmful side effects induced-by the consumption of
such innocuous substances as sugar and butter, unless contaminated,
will not give rise to a strict liability claim. 8 4 Presumably, such dangers
are squarely within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer.8"
In applying section 402 A, some courts have interpreted the phrase

"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" as an articulation of two
distinct requirements for recovery and have expressly recognized the
necessity of satisfying this bifurcated standard."' On the other hand,
some courts have used "defective product" and "unreasonably dangerous" interchangeably, 87 lending weight to the argument that these terms
8
have the same meaning.

The first New Jersey decision in which the doctrine of strict liabil-

39
ity in tort was expressly applied, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,
32

Id. comment i at 352.

83 See Traynor, supra note 29, at 370. Dean Prosser explained that "the prevailing

interpretation of 'defective' is that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety." W. PROSSER, Tm LAW OF TORTS § 99, at
659 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co.,
42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (a defective product is one which is dangerous because
it fails to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and
intended function).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment i at 352-53. Comment i emphasizes that there must be something wrong with the product in order for it to be
unreasonably dangerous. The seller of ordinary sugar, for example, will not incur
liability merely because it is a deadly poison to a diabetic. Nor will the seller of good
butter be liable for suffering caused by deposits of cholesterol in the arteries, which
lead to heart attacks. Id.
85 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 441 (1972).
86 Downey v. Moore's Time-Saving Equip., Inc., 432 F.2d 1088, 1091 (7th Cir. 1970);
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1968); LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,
275 F. Supp. 373, 379 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429
(N.D. Ind. 1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965);
Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 79, 215 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1966); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 421-22, 398 S.W.2d 240, 249-50 (1966).
37 See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 182, 199 A.2d 826,
829 (1964) (involving an allegedly defective abrasive disc). See also Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 692, 702 (1965); Note, Products Liability and
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 296-97 (1966).
38 Wade, supra note 30, at 14-15.
39 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See Note, Privity Eliminated as a Requirement
in Loss-of-Bargain Products Liability Cases-The Effects of Santor, 19 RuTGERS L. REv.
715 (1965). A contrary approach was taken in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), in which the California supreme court was unwilling to extend the strict tort liability theory to the loss of the bargain. Seely dis-
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involved purely economic loss. In committing New Jersey to the theory
of strict liability in tort as the sound solution, 40 the court permitted a
purchaser of a defective rug to recover his economic loss in a direct action against the manufacturer. 4' Concluding that the basis of recovery
should not depend upon the nature of the injury, the court stated that
"[i]t should make no difference that the defect in the product did not
or was not likely to cause harm to the purchaser. '42 Rather, a manufacturer would incur liability only
[i]f the article is defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such articles are sold and used, and the defect
arose out of the design or manufacture or while the article was in
the control of the manufacturer, and it proximately causes injury

or damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected consumer. ... 43
Although the court made clear the necessity of finding a product defective, the additional requirement that the defect render the product
unreasonably dangerous was conspicuously absent. This is particularly
significant because in the Santor opinion, the court expressly set forth
in detail the elements of the newly recognized cause of action based on
strict liability in tort.
Two days after the Santor decision, the court considered the imposition of strict liability in tort for personal injuries caused by a defective product. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,4 4 an infant was severely

scalded by excessively hot water drawn from a bathroom faucet. 4 The
tinguished between the law of warranty as a regulation of economic relationships and
strict liability in tort as a regulation of the responsibility for physical injuries.
40 44 N.J. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
41 The court permitted the plaintiff to recover the difference between the price
paid for the carpet marketed as Grade #1 and its actual value at the time when he
knew, or should have known, it was defective. Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d at 314.
42 Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
43 Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313. Justice Francis explained that by imposing the
responsibility for defective products on the manufacturer, the obligation becomes what
in justice it ought to be-an enterprise liability. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. Inherent
in this principle is the theory that losses caused should be borne by those who have
created the risk and have reaped profits by placing the product in the stream of commerce.
Consonant with this approach is the risk-spreading argument espoused by Justice
Traynor in Escola -.. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor maintained that manufacturers, as a
group and an industry, should absorb the inevitable losses which must result in a
complex civilization from the use of their products since they are in a better position
to do so. Through their prices they can pass such losses on to the community at large.
44 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
45 Id. at 73-74, 207 A.2d at 316.
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allegation that the heating unit was defectively designed, equipped, and
manufactured, 46 compelled the court to determine the respective liabilities of York, the manufacturer of the heating unit, and Levitt, its designer, assembler, and installer. Because the heating units were not
defective 47 when they were delivered to Levitt, York was absolved of
liability.48 Levitt, however, incurred responsibility based on the principles of strict liability in tort.49 To Levitt's contention that imposition of
such liability would have the effect of making developers "virtual insurers" 5° of the safety of their premises, the court responded that a
plaintiff could recover only if he established that the "design was 'unreasonably dangerous' and proximately caused the injury." 51 Although
46 Id. at 76, 207 A.2d at 318.
47 Id. at 97, 207 A.2d at 329. The heating units functioned strictly as they were intended. The unreasonably dangerous condition did not arise from the heating unit
itself, but rather from the subsequent improper installation which did not include the
necessary mixing valve.
48 Id. Evidence adduced at trial revealed that York, the manufacturer of the unit,
recommended that Levitt install a mixing valve for the express purpose of avoiding
excessively hot water. Levitt deliberately chose not to follow this recommendation. Id.
49 The precise theory on which liability was predicated in Schipper was obscured
by the court's consistent reference to "warranty or strict liability principles". Additionally, the court buttressed its conclusion that Levitt should be held liable by invoking
language suggesting both warranty and strict liability in tort theories:
The public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the defective
construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible developer who created
the danger and who is in the better economic position to bear the loss rather
than by the injured party who justifiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representation.
Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
A possible explanation for the reliance on the dual reference to "warranty or strict
liability principles" is the court's desire to explain its rationale not only in familiar
warranty terminology, but also in language consistent with the newly recognized theory
of strict liability in tort.
50 Id. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326. That the theory of strict liability in tort does not
impose on one the role of an absolute insurer has been expressly recognized in Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452-53, 212 A.2d 769, 779 (1965)
(landmark case holding bailor strictly liable in tort).
51 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326. As support for this proposition, the court cited
Noel, supra note 30, at 877-78.
Noel, in speculating about the trend toward the applicability of strict liability
principles, alludes to section 402 A and the requirement that a product be unreasonably
dangerous. Although at the time his article was published the section 402 A proposal
extended only to food items, Noel raised the question that
[i]f this principle should be extended to other products, where defective design
or composition is alleged, when would the design be defective and unreasonably
dangerous?
Id. at 877.
Apparently the Schipper court, cognizant of the judicial trend in extending the
theory of strict liability in tort to damage caused by "any product," incorporated Noel's
speculation as a sound determination of the existence of a design defect. -
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the Schipper decision made no mention of section 402 A of the Restatement, 52 the dictum regarding the unreasonably dangerous requirement
is fully consistent with its provisions.
Additional dictum in Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick 53 demonstrated the New Jersey supreme court's willingness to adhere to the provisions set forth in section 402 A of the Restatement. In an action to
recover for damages caused when a water meter on plaintiff's premises
broke, the plaintiff alleged, in part, that the meter which was installed
by the city and manufactured by Worthington Gamon Meter Company,
was defective when manufactured. 54 To prove the alleged defective condition of the device, the court required that the plaintiff establish that
the meter was "dangerously defective when it 'left the defendant's
hands.' -55 To support its application of this terminology, the court cited
to section 402 A and quoted from Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon,56 a leading
Tennessee case which expressly recognized the necessity that a plaintiff
establish the unreasonably dangerous condition of the defendant's
product.
"There seems to be no unfairness in holding that a manufacturer who markets a product which is not only defective but unreasonably dangerous should be responsible for any physical harm
no privity of conwhich results to person or property, even though
57
tract and no negligence can be established."
Further reference to the applicability of section 402 A was made
by the New Jersey supreme court in Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.5s In
52 Schipper was decided on Feb. 19, 1965. RESTATzMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A
was adopted by the American Law Institute on May 22, 1964. 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 375
(1964).
58 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
54 Id. at 134, 238 A.2d at 171. The court had occasion to analyze the character of
the strict tort liability theory for the purpose of deciding the application of the statute
of limitations. The court recognized that the claim, grounded on strict liability in tort,
was governed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (1952) which provides in part:
Every action at law . . . for any tortious injury to real or personal property
... shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action
shall have accrued.
51 N.J. at 143, 238 A.2d at 176. See also Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412
(1973) (tort rather than contract statute of limitations governs products liability action).
55 51 N.J. at 136, 238 A.2d at 172 (quoting from Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 182, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964)).
56 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
57 51 N.J. at 136, 238 A.2d at 172 (quoting from Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn.
at 421-22, 398 S.W.2d at 249-50).
58 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). Plaintiff, suffering acute dermatitis allegedly
caused by the application of a defective product, initiated suit alleging both negligence
and breach of warranty on the part of the defendant. However, the court, relying on
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assessing the liability of a beauty parlor operator who applied a defective permanent wave solution to a patron's hair, the court alluded to
section 402 A to.support its premise that the tort theory of recovery extends to a customer who has a product applied to his body for consideration. 59 In analyzing the plaintiff's burden of proof, the court concluded
that the plaintiff need only establish that a dangerously defective product caused physical harm. 60 An examination of Schipper, Rosenau and
Newmark, therefore, indicates that the court has addressed the issue of
the nature of the defect in diverse terminology, i.e., unreasonably dangerous and dangerously defective. The practical effect of this apparent
inconsistency has been to obfuscate the precise elements that comprise
a prima facie case in an action based on strict liability in tort.
In 1972, the New Jersey supreme court again explicitly addressed
the issue of strict liability in tort in terms of section 402 A. In Bexiga
v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,61 the plaintiff sustained serious injuries
when a heavy industrial punchpress, lacking protective safety devices,
was activated. The gravamen of the complaint, grounded in negligence,
strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty of fitness of purpose, was
that the machinery was so dangerous in design that the manufacturer
was under a duty to equip it with a safety device. 62 The court held that
where there is an unreasonable risk of harm to the user of a machine which has no protective safety device

. . .

the jury may infer

that the machine was defective in design unless it finds that the incorporation by the manufacturer of a safety device would render
the machine unusable for its intended purposes. 68
Henningsen and Santor, concluded that the intricacies of the law of sales should not
govern the theory of recovery and, therefore, applied the theory of strict liability in
tort. Id. at 594, 258 A.2d at 701.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402 A, comment I at 354 (1965) details the
users and consumers to whom recovery in a strict liability in tort action will extend.
The comment explicitly states that "the customer in a beauty shop to whose hair a
permanent wave solution is applied by the shop is a consumer." Id.
The significance of Newmark is the clarification it offers regarding the sale-service
distinction. The trial court had dismissed the cause of action based on warranty because
the transaction did not constitute a sale within the contemplation of the Uniform
Commercial Code, but rather entailed the performance of services. The New Jersey
supreme court found that the distinction between a sale and the rendition of services
is a highly artificial one and, thus, classified the Newmark transaction as a "hybrid
partaking of incidents of a sale and a service." 54 N.J. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701. The court
had no difficulty imposing tort liability based on the same policy considerations that
require warranty liability to be utilized in the case of ordinary sales. The court, however, emphasized that the same policy justifications are inapplicable for assessing
liability for services rendered by a doctor or dentist. Id. at 597, 258 A.2d at 703.
60 54 N.J. at 595, 258 A.2d at 702.
61 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
62 Id. at 404-05, 290 A.2d at 282.
63 Id. at 410-11, 290 A.2d at 285.
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A companion case, Finnegan v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,64 was
decided on the same rationale. To insure maximum safety for the ultimate user of the product, the court chose to place the responsibility for
the inclusion of feasible safety devices on the manufacturer. 65 The combined significance of Bexiga and Finnegan is the express recognition
of the inapplicability of the 402 A provision absolving the manufacturer
of liability when he relies on a subsequent purchaser to complete a
critical phase of manufacturing which renders a product safe.6 6 Hence,
the court demonstrated its willingness to eliminate any portion of section 402 A that would minimize consumer protection.
Although the foregoing cases illustrate that the New Jersey supreme court has never expressly adopted the section 402 A requirement
that a product be unreasonably dangerous, some inferior state courts
have stringently adhered to the Restatement position. 67 In Devaney v.
Sarno,68 the court disposed of plaintiff's claim by relying on the provisions of section 402 A. The plaintiff in Devaney alleged that a defective
seatbelt contributed to the seriousness of the injuries sustained in an
automobile collision. 69 Although he had discovered the defect prior
to the accident and continued to drive his car, the plaintiff contended
that the defect rendered the vehicle unreasonably dangerous. The court
found plaintiff's argument untenable in light of the numbers of vehicles
manufactured without seatbelts prior to the government regulations
requiring them. 70 The court found additional justification for barring
the plaintiff from recovery in view of his conduct in continuing to use
71
the car after discovering the defect.
64 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972). For a more detailed discussion of Bexiga and
Finnegan, see Note, The Manufacturer is Responsible for Installing "Feasible" Safety
Devices on Unreasonably Dangerous Machinery, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 397 (1972).
65 Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285; Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423, 290 A.2d at 292.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402 A (1) (b).
67 See, e.g., Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (L.
Div. 1967), rev'd, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
68 122 N.J. Super. 99, 299 A.2d 95 (L. Div. 1973).
69 Id. at 101-02, 299 A.2d at 96.
70 Id. at 107-08, 299 A.2d at 99.
71 Id. at 108, 299 A.2d at 99-100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment n
at 356 explains the availability of the defense of contributory negligence in a strict
liability in tort action:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption
of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery.
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The approach taken by New Jersey courts to the criteria essential
to establish a claim in strict tort liability has revealed a disposition
basically favorable to the Restatement position. Nevertheless, in Glass,
Judge Steinbrugge felt free to purge the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement from strict tort liability in New Jersey because it has never
been expressly adopted as the common law of the state. 72 In his judgment, "[t]he function of the 'unreasonably dangerous' qualification in
73
§ 402A is, at best, unclear."
One cogent view of the utility of the requirement of unreasonable
danger is that it was added to prevent a manufacturer of an inherently
dangerous product (e.g., whiskey, drugs) from becoming "automatically
responsible for all the harm that such things do in the world." 74 In attempting to avoid this injustice to the manufacturer, the requirement
that a product be unreasonably dangerous has shifted an additional
burden to the injured consumer. The practical effect of such a requirement is to burden the plaintiff with an element of proof that "rings of
'76
negligence" 75 and therefore "represents a step backward.
New Jersey was not the first jurisdiction to judicially excise the
requirement of unreasonable danger from a cause of action based on
strict liability in tort. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,77 the California
supreme court addressed itself to the sole issue of the unreasonably
dangerous requirement. Plaintiff, a delivery truck driver, was injured
when a hasp, designed to hold bread trays in place, broke in a collision
between the truck and another vehicle, enabling the trays to strike the
plaintiff's back. In holding that a plaintiff proceeding on a strict tort
liability theory need not establish that the injury-causing defect made
See also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Finnegan v. Havir
Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463,
251 A.2d 278 (1969); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serm., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
72 123 N.J. Super. at 603, 304 A.2d at 564-65. Shortly after Glass, however, the
supreme court indicated that New Jersey case law is generally consistent with Restatement
principles:
It is readily apparent that New Jersey case law to date, as previously discussed,
is generally in accord with the Restatement thesis, with the addition that we have,
by Santor, extended the concept to consumer loss-of-the-bargain situations, at
least where the action is against the manufacturer.
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 152, 305 A.2d 412, 424 (1973).
78 123 N.J. Super. at 602, 304 A.2d at 564.
74 Id.
(quoting from Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966)).
75 123 N.J. Super. at 602, 304 A.2d at 564 (quoting from Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972)).
76 123 N.J. Super. at 603, 304 A.2d at 565 (quoting from Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133,
501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442).
77 8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
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the product unreasonably dangerous, the court emphasized the negligence complexion of the phrase. To determine the "unreasonableness"
78
of the danger, a jury must resort to a "reasonable man" approach.
Hence, if a jury concludes that
the "ordinary consumer" would have expected the defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable regardless of the
79
expectations of the injured plaintiff.

To burden the plaintiff with proof of this nature is to defeat the basic
purpose for which the theory of strict liability in tort was developedthat is, "to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pur80
suing negligence ... remedies."
In deciding Glass, Judge Steinbrugge relied heavily on Cronin's
rejection of the reasonable man standard which, in the court's view,
inevitably creeps into a jury's analysis when determining a consumer's
appreciation of a defective product's unreasonable danger. To establish a burden of proof consistent with the purpose of strict liability in
tort, the Glass court adopted the rationale of Cronin, and following
the initiative of the California court, expunged the requirement that
a defective product be unreasonably dangerous."" Because Glass emphasizes the need to divorce negligence overtones from the proofs in a
strict liability in tort action, it marks a judicial triumph for the consumer. In this respect, Glass is consonant with the overall trend of
consumer law in easing the burdens confronting an injured plaintiff.
Nevertheless, Glass introduces, rather than resolves, a serious question regarding the nature of a defect, in particular, a design defect.
Because courts have traditionally found that a product is defectively
designed when the design renders the product unreasonably danger78

Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.

79 Id.
80 123 N.J. Super. at 602-03, 304 A.2d at 564 (quoting from Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at
133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 442). Judge Steinbrugge explored the relationship
between negligence and strict liability in tort in Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super.
299, 296 A.2d 668 (L. Div. 1972) (strict liability applied to a blood bank furnishing blood
infected with serum hepatitis virus). In Brody, Judge Steinbrugge observed that the
notions of negligence and strict liability are antithetical to each other. Negligence can
be refuted with a showing of "due care" by the defendant, but "due care" is irrelevant
in a strict liability situation. Id. at 309, 296 A.2d at 673.
8i The Cronin court expressly returned to the Greenman formulation as one consonant with the rationale and development of products liability law in California. The
Cronin court considered the Greenman approach to be a clear and simple test for
determining whether the injured plaintiff is entitled to recovery. 8 Cal. 3d at 135, 501
P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
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ous,82 any decision which excises that requirement should offer a viable,
well-defined, alternative standard. Glass, however, fails to do this. By
expressly adopting section 402 A without the unreasonably dangerous
requirement, Glass incorporates the Restatement definition of a defect
as a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer."' s Such
a definition appears too imprecise for judicial application.
Additionally, because the most important determinant in a strict
liability in tort action is the standard of measuring product defectiveness,8 4 it is incumbent upon the courts to formulate a standard which
clarifies, rather than obscures, the exact criterion to determine the existence of a defect. Until an appellate court addresses the issue of the
scope and meaning of the word "defective," ' 5 and resolves the basic
question of what constitutes a defect, the grounds on which a manufacturer's liability will be predicated will remain unsettled.
Mary Lou Parker
82 See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 202
N.W.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1972).
83 The Restatement definition of defective condition is one "not contemplated by
the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." REsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment g at 351.
84 See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L Rav. 439 (1969); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1329 (1966).
85 No appeal has been taken from Glass. The jury rendered a unanimous verdict of
no cause of action.

